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Article 
Attribution Issues in Cyberspace 
 
Collin S. Allan* 
 
Abstract 
 
This article discusses one of the problems with the current 
condition of the international attribution regime.  The rise 
of non-state actors in international and internal conflicts 
has created many problems for the international 
community.  This is especially true in the case of cyber 
attacks.  The tests for attributing the actions of a non-state 
actor to a state were devised before the age of the Internet 
and before cyber attacks accompanied armed attacks.  The 
entities that conceived the attribution tests were unable to 
factor cyber attacks into their considerations because, in 
large part, the ability to conduct a cyber attack had yet to 
be developed.  Cyber attacks can have a devastating 
impact on a state’s economy and infrastructure.  Because 
new technological developments allow non-state actors to 
launch cyber attacks, especially those implemented in 
conjunction with armed attacks, as was the case in 
Georgia in 2008, the international community should 
reassess where it stands on the issue of attribution. 
 
This article uses the Georgia-Russia conflict as a window 
into the problems of attribution.  It examines the 
attribution tests set forth in the International Court of 
Justice’s Nicaragua decision, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s Tadi! decision, and 
Article 8 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.  This article calls on the 
relevant parties to set a lower standard for attribution, 
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especially when a cyber attack occurs in conjunction with 
an armed attack. 
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Attribution Issues in Cyberspace 
 
Collin S. Allan 
 
Introduction 
 
 The rise of non-state actors in international and internal conflicts 
has created many problems for the international community.  This is 
especially true in the case of cyber attacks. Organized crime groups and 
individual civilians located in Russia provide examples of non-state actors 
that have played a major role in cyber attacks.  While organized crime 
groups may traditionally be recognized for everything from human 
trafficking to grisly murders, one thing they are generally not known for is 
their participation in armed conflicts through cyber attacks aimed against 
the Russian government’s enemies.  The participation of individual 
civilians, sometimes referred to as hacktivists, in armed conflicts through 
cyber attacks is equally surprising.  Specifically, Russian organized crime 
groups and individual civilians from Russia recently participated in the 
Georgia-Russia conflict.  This participation has turned many people’s 
attention to non-state actors’ involvement in cyber warfare. 
 The background behind Russia’s organized crime groups reveals 
the extent to which these groups have worked with the Russian government 
and raises legal questions of state attribution for actions taken by non-state 
actors.  During Soviet times, organized crime initially made inroads shortly 
after the Communist revolution, peaking in the 1930s before diminishing 
due to infighting and state pressure.1  Organized crime made a resurgence 
during Brezhnev’s tenure, as different groups sought to increase ties with 
the government.2  Under Gorbachev, the government began to implement 
decentralizing reforms, and organized crime groups “seized the opportunity 
to monopolize” industries abandoned by the government, “greatly 
expand[ing] their influence and financial base.”3  
 With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, organized 
crime flourished in Russia, engaging in everything from human trafficking 
to violence to the drug trade.4  During this time, organized crime groups 
expanded their influence into legitimate businesses as a cover for their 
                                           
1 Vsevolod Sokolov, From Guns to Briefcases: The Evolution of Russian Organized Crime, 21 WORLD 
POL’Y J. 68, 69 (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 70. 
4 Id. 
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illegitimate activities.5  Russian organized crime has largely left the realm 
of more base criminal pursuits, as crime bosses have transferred their 
financial holdings into more legitimate ventures.6   
In his first term, Putin promised to crack down on organized 
crime.7  Despite this promise, organized crime in Russia has maintained a 
transnational influence:8 it has connections to organized crime in Western 
Europe, South America, and Asia.9  Russian organized crime has taken 
advantage of “the opportunities for increased activity” due to globalization 
and the breaking down of boundaries between states due to advances in 
technology.10 The truly frightening aspect of these developments, however, 
is organized crime’s renewed influence.11  In fact, it is such a problem that 
“[m]any within and outside of Russia see it as a national security issue for 
the Russian state.”12  With the evolution of Russia’s organized crime and 
the spread of globalization, crime groups have diversified their activities 
and delved into cyber-crime.13  One of their most influential forays took 
place during the Georgia-Russia conflict of 2008.  
 On the evening of August 7, 2008, the tension that had been 
building along the Russian-Georgian border for several months reached a 
head, resulting in an armed conflict between Russian and Georgian 
forces.14  While people around the world watched clips of tanks and aircraft 
destroying buildings and wounding civilians, there was an aspect of the 
conflict that was not as readily apparent to the casual observer, newspaper-
reader, or cable news-watcher: cyber attacks.  
  Cyber attackers within Russia launched the first of two phases of 
cyber attacks against Georgia on August 7, 2008, the same day that armed 
attacks began.15  Cyber attackers, many of them civilians or hacktivists, 
targeted and shut down Georgian news and government websites, 
effectively cutting off Georgia from the rest of the world and the Georgian 
                                           
5 Id. at 70-71. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 71. 
8 Louise Shelley, Contemporary Russian Organised Crime:  Embedded in Russian Society, in 
ORGANISED CRIME IN EUROPE: PATTERNS AND POLICIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND BEYOND 563 
(Cyrille Fijnaut & Letizia Paoli eds., Springer 2004). 
9 Id. at 563, 570, 576. 
10 Leslie Holmes, Corruption and Organised Crime in Putin's Russia, 60 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 1011, 
1012 (2008). 
11 Shelley, supra note 8, at 571, 575-576, 579.  
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 577. 
14 C.J. Chivers, In Georgia and Russia, A Perfect Brew for a Blowup, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, at 
A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/11/world/europe/11ticktock.html?_r=0. 
15 Paulo Shakarian, The 2008 Russian Cyber Campaign Against Georgia, 91 MILITARY REV. 63, 63 
(2011). 
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people from any crucial information they may have obtained from their 
government.16  The botnets used to carry out the distributed denial of 
service (“DDoS”) attacks were affiliated with Russian organized crime 
groups, including the Russian Business Network (“RBN”), a criminal 
organization known to use and lease botnets for criminal purposes.17  This 
conflict marked the first time that a large-scale cyber attack was 
“conducted in tandem with major ground combat operations.”18 
 With the rise and increasing participation of non-state actors in 
attacks throughout the world against states, many wonder how the Law of 
Armed Conflict (“LOAC”) can or should apply to non-state actors.19  This 
question is especially relevant when attacks occur in cyberspace because of 
the difficulty in determining the concrete identity of cyber attackers or the 
origins of the attack.20  For example, in 2007, Estonia was the victim of 
crippling cyber attacks.21  A search for the origin of the attacks led experts 
not only to Russia and several Russian government institutions, but also to 
177 other countries.22  While the 2008 cyber attacks in Georgia were not 
the first cyber attacks against another state, they marked the first time such 
an attack occurred in concert with an armed attack against another state.23  
Furthermore, they marked the first time that a state either coincidentally or 
intentionally employed non-state actors to conduct a cyber attack in tandem 
with its armed attack.  
 The combined nature of cyber and armed attacks raises many legal 
questions.  This article focuses on the question of state responsibility and 
explores how much control a state must exert over non-state actors before 
the actions of those non-state actors becomes imputable to the state, using 
                                           
16 Id.  
17 Id. at 64. 
18 Id. at 63; John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyber Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1, 
available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.  
19 See Carina Bergal, The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-International Armed Conflict 
Classification, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1042 (2011); Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against 
Non-state Actors Under International Law: An Analysis of the U.S. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA 
J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 331 (2003); William Schabas, Punishment of Non-State Actors in Non-
International Armed Conflict, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 907 (2003). 
20 See Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569, 
570, 594-595 (2011). 
21 Id. at 569. 
22 Id. at 570. 
23 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 63; Markoff, supra at note 18, at A1.  See Scott J. Shackelford, From 
Nuclear War to Net War: Analogizing Cyber Attacks in International Law, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
192 (2009).  Not only have Estonia and Georgia been the victims of cyber attacks within the past eight 
years, but Lithuania and Kazakhstan have also been victims of cyber attacks.  U.S. Cyber Consequences 
Unit Special Report, Overview by the US-CCU of the Cyber Campaign Against Georgia in August of 
2008, 1 (Aug. 2009), http://www.registan.net/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/US-CCU-Georgia-Cyber-
Campaign-Overview.pdf. 
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the Georgia-Russia conflict as an example.  The main goal of this article is 
not to assign blame in the Georgia-Russia conflict, but rather to explore the 
current condition of attribution and its application to cyber warfare, 
especially when cyber attacks are conducted in concert with a kinetic 
attack.  
 The International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility”) summarize the current tests for state 
responsibility.  These tests are articulated in the International Court of 
Justice’s (“ICJ”) Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against 
Nicaragua case (“Nicaragua”), and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’s (“ICTY”) Prosecutor v. Tadi! case (“Tadi!”).  
The ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility deal with the principal of 
control in general, and, in the Articles’ commentary, the ILC looks to both 
Nicaragua and Tadi! for articulations of control tests.  Nicaragua and 
Tadi! examine control as it deals with a state’s control over armed groups.  
 Because the proliferation of cyber attacks are post-Nicaragua and 
Tadi! developments, the courts deciding those cases did not include cyber 
attacks in their determinations.  The Georgia-Russia conflict exemplifies 
the difficulty in applying the control tests to a conflict that includes cyber 
attacks.  The differences in the way that kinetic attacks are carried out, as 
opposed to the way cyber attacks are conducted, make it difficult for tests 
designed to apply to armed groups and civilians carrying out physical acts 
through kinetic warfare to apply to attacks that take place in cyberspace.  
Because of these differences and the attendant issues that arise in a 
cyberspace attack, the international community should consider a new test 
for addressing the issue of attribution when cyber attacks occur in tandem 
with an armed attack.  Currently, the tests set an unworkably high bar in 
determining when a state may be responsible for the actions of a non-state 
actor, given the context of cyber attacks.  This test must lower the required 
degree of connection between a state and a non-state cyber attacker before 
a state may be responsible for the non-state cyber attacker’s actions.  
 Section I of this article begins to discuss the need for a new test to 
measure state responsibility by examining the factual framework of the 
2008 Georgia-Russia conflict.  Section II discusses the current attribution 
regime as developed in Nicaragua, Tadi!, and Article 8 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility.  Section III explores the application of the 
current attribution regime and other relevant international law to 2008 
Georgia-Russia, highlighting the problems of the existing legal regime.  
Finally, Section IV continues to discuss problems with the current 
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attribution regime and asserts possible solutions, or at least potential 
positive changes. 
   
I. The Georgia-Russia Cyber Conflict:  A Two-Pronged Attack 
 
 The details surrounding the kinetic and cyber conflicts between 
Russia and Georgia are unclear at best.  There is still speculation as to 
which party initiated the cyber attacks against Georgia and no hard 
evidence as to the Russian government’s level of involvement.  The exact 
identity of who orchestrated the cyber attacks is unknown.  Georgia blames 
Russian government for the attacks, but the Russian government denies all 
accusations.24  While it is not clear who was behind the cyber attack, 
American computer security researchers “saw clear evidence of a shadowy 
St. Petersburg-based criminal gang known as the . . . RBN.”25  The 
following are the facts as experts have discussed and written them.      
 From the beginning of the conflict, Georgia faced a two-pronged 
attack.26  The first prong employed conventional means:  tanks, aircraft, 
missiles, and bullets.  The second prong was an unprecedented cyber attack 
that coincided with the conventional attack, targeting the Georgian 
government and business websites.27  Attacks on businesses and financial 
institutions caused international financial institutions to cut off operations 
with Georgian banks.28  One purpose for the attacks may have been to 
cause economic damage.29 Additionally, the attacks had “a significant 
informational and psychological impact on Georgia.”30  The attacks 
disabled cellphone services throughout the country and “effectively 
isolated [Georgia] from the outside world.”31 The Russian armed forces 
benefited from the cyber attacks.  For example, Russian armed forces did 
not attack Georgian “media and communication facilities,” which may 
have been due to the success of the cyber attacks.32       
 The first phase of the cyber attack consisted of Russian cyber 
attackers launching DDoS attacks.33  The purpose of a DDoS is “to prevent 
                                           
24 Markoff, supra note 18. 
25 Id. 
26 Chivers, supra note 14; Markoff, supra note 18. 
27 Markoff, supra note 18. 
28 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 65-66. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 63. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 65. 
33 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 63. 
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the legitimate use of a computing source.”34 During this initial phase, the 
DDoS attacks were primarily carried out by botnets, “a group of computers 
on the Internet . . . that have been infected with a piece of software known 
as malware.”35  Criminal organizations, including the RBN, are known to 
“use and lease botnets for various purposes.”36  The botnets used in the 
attack against Georgia were “affiliated with Russian criminal organizations, 
including the RBN.”37  Cyber security experts stated that in some cases, the 
attacks originated from computers known to be controlled by the RBN.38  
During the second phase of the attack, the cyber campaign expanded from 
government targets to include “financial institutions, businesses, 
educational institutions, Western media . . . and a Georgian hacker 
website.”39 
 Questions regarding whether the RBN coordinated with or were 
under the control of the Russian government remain unsettled.40  However, 
experts believe the fact that the attacks occurred only “one day prior to the 
ground campaign” indicates “that the hackers knew about the date of the 
invasion beforehand.”41  There is little hard evidence of coordination 
beyond the close timing of both the conventional attack and the cyber 
attack.42  The Russian government has not accepted responsibility for the 
attacks, nor has it formally approved of them.  Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok, 
the head of the Russian Military Forecasting Center, in discussing this 
conflict, was careful not to attribute the cyber attacks to the Russian 
government.43  Nonetheless, he described the cyber campaign “as part of a 
larger information battle with Georgian and Western media.”44 
 While Russian organized crime groups provided the means for the 
attacks, including the malware and advice on how to carry out the attacks, 
and conducted many of the attacks themselves, they made up only one 
group of those involved in the cyber attacks against Georgia.45  “Patriotic” 
Russian civilians, likely using personal computers, also comprised a large 
                                           
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 64. 
37 Id. 
38 Markoff, supra note 18. 
39 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 64. 
40 Markoff, supra note 18. 
41 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 64. 
42 Id. at 66. 
43 Id. at 65. 
44 Id. 
45 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 63-64. 
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number of cyber attack participants.46  Therefore, while the organized 
crime groups in large part provided the means for the attacks, these civilian 
Russian sympathizers, termed “hacktivists,”47 actually carried out the 
attacks.48  The civilians were able to carry out the attacks by visiting 
various websites, which contained “user-friendly button[s]” and provided 
instructions that “were very accessible, even for a novice user.”49  One cite 
had a button labeled “‘FLOOD’ which, when clicked, deployed multiple 
DDoS attacks on Georgia.”50   
 
II. The Law Governing Attribution 
   
 Any connection between the organized crime groups and Russia 
that would establish Russian responsibility for the cyber attacks must 
derive from international law.  The ILC’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility summarize this law.  The Nicaragua and Tadi! cases 
articulate the tests used to determine what level of control is necessary 
before a state becomes responsible for the actions of non-state actors.  
Article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility discusses the 
principle of imputing a non-state actor’s actions to the state.51  The 
commentary to this article expounds on the text.  In Nicaragua, the ICJ 
discussed how much and what kind of control a state needs to exert over a 
non-state actor in order for the non-state actor’s actions to be attributed to 
the state.52  Additionally, the ICJ formulated the “effective control test” in 
Nicaragua.53  The ICTY discussed the same principle in Tadi!.54  However, 
the ICTY rejected the ICJ’s effective control test and concluded that the 
lower standard of overall control was sufficient to attribute a non-state 
actor’s actions to the state.55 
                                           
46 U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit Special Report, supra note 23, at 2-3; Noah Shachtman, Top 
Georgian Official: Moscow Cyber Attacked Us – We Just Can't Prove It, WIRED NEWS (Mar. 11, 2009), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/georgia-blames/; Joshua E. Kastenberg, Non-Intervention 
and Neutrality in Cyberspace: An Emerging Principle in the National Practice of International Law, 64 
A.F. L. Rev. 43, 64 (2009). 
47 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 64. 
48 U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit Special Report, supra note 23, at 3. 
49 Shakarian, supra note 15, at 64. 
50 Id. 
51 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 
8, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001). 
52 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27). 
53 Id. ¶ 115. 
54 Prosecutor v. Tadi!, Case No. IT-94-1-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999). 
55 While the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the construction of the wall in Palestinian territory by Israel 
arguably addressed effective control, its decision does not fall within the purview of this article.  The 
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A. Article 8 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
 
  Article 8 of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility states 
that the “conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act 
of a State under international law” in two situations:  when a person or 
people are acting “on the instructions of” that state, or when a person or 
people are acting under “the direction or control of” the state.56  The 
purpose of Article 8 is to single out states that employ private individuals to 
carry out activities that would be inappropriate for the states or their 
officials to engage in.57  Therefore, a state cannot avoid responsibility by 
having a private individual or group of private individuals do the state’s 
“dirty work.”  The commentary on the draft articles explores the legal 
underpinnings of the article and, in large part, turns to both Nicaragua and 
Tadi! for guidance.  
 The commentary for Article 8 begins by stating that the general 
rule in international law is that a state will not be responsible for the actions 
of private persons or private entities.58  It goes on to say, however, that the 
existence of a “specific factual relationship” between the state and a person 
or group of people may create a circumstance where the actions of those 
non-state actors are attributed to the state.59  The commentary analyzes the 
two situations when these circumstances may arise.60   
First, when a person or group of people acts on the instructions of a 
state, it is accepted that the state has authorized those actions.61  When a 
state has authorized conduct, international jurisprudence often attributes 
                                                                                                  
ICJ determined that Israel was not seeking to attribute the terrorist attacks to a state, but rather, Israel 
stated that the attacks arose from within this territory, constituting a threat to Israel’s security.  Because 
Israel was not attempting to attribute the attacks to a state, this case does not fall within the context of 
this article (see Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 138-140 (July 9)).  Furthermore, because the attacks in Israel were 
arising within territory that Israel claimed to control and not from outside if this territory, a factual 
distinction arises between that case and the Georgia-Russia conflict. 
56 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 49.  Articles 4 and 5 also address state responsibility.  Article 4 
addresses responsibility for the actions of a state’s organs.  Article 5 addresses non-state actors that are 
empowered by the state to “exercise elements of the governmental authority.”  However, because the 
facts seem fairly clear that the cyber attacks were perpetrated by groups that were neither government 
organs nor empowered to exercise elements of government authority, these articles will not be 
considered in detail in this article.  Rather, it seems to be clear that organized crime groups and civilians 
carried out the acts.  
57 Tadi!, supra at 54, ¶ 117.  
58 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 51, art.8, cmt. 1.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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that conduct to the state, even if the people involved are private individuals 
and even if their conduct does not involve “‘governmental activity’” per 
se.62  The rational is that when a person or group of people has a state’s 
authorization to do something, they become a de facto organ of that state.63  
Most often, this will occur when a state or one of its organs recruits private 
groups to perform activities or missions outside its borders.64  
  In the second situation, it is more difficult to attribute conduct to a 
state when the actions were carried out “‘under the direction or control’ of 
a State.”65  If an individual or group of people act “under the direction or 
control of a State,” that conduct will be attributed to the state.66  However, 
conduct “will be attributable to the State only if it directed or controlled the 
specific operation and the conduct complained of was an integral part of 
that operation.”67  If the conduct was only incidental or peripheral to the 
operation, then this principle does not extend to that conduct.68  The 
commentary, unfortunately, does not discuss the difference between 
integral involvement and mere incidental or peripheral involvement.  
However, it does briefly discuss the Nicaragua and Tadi! cases, as they 
constitute Article 8’s legal origin.  
 
B. Nicaragua and The Effective Control Test 
 
 In Nicaragua, the ICJ established the effective control test as a 
means to determine whether the actions of a non-state actor can be 
attributed to a state based on the level of control that state exercises over 
the non-state actor.69  The ICJ looked at the United States’ involvement in 
the conflict between the contras and the Sandinistas during the 1980s to 
determine whether the U.S.’ actions reached a sufficient level of control 
over the contras to attribute the contras’ actions to the U.S.70 
 The ICJ wrestled with the degree of control the United States 
needed to exert over the contras before responsibility for the contras’ 
actions could be attributed to the United States.71 Nicaragua attempted to 
                                           
62 Id. cmt. 2. 
63 Tadi!, supra note 54, ¶ 104. 
64 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 51, art. 2. 
65 Id. cmt. 3. 
66 Id. cmt. 1. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ ¶ 
109, 115 (June 27).  
70 See id. 
71 Id. ¶ 113. 
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attribute the contras’ actions to the United States in order to show that the 
United States had violated an obligation of international law “not to kill, 
wound or kidnap citizens of Nicaragua.”72  Nicaragua claimed the United 
States government “devised the strategy and directed the tactics of the 
contra force, and provided direct combat support for its military 
operations.”73  Nicaragua relied on the correlation between the timing of 
repeated receipt of new funds from the United States and a subsequent 
offensive by the contras,74 the supply of aircraft, intelligence assistance, 
and tactical directions provided by United States personnel.75  The United 
States admitted the “nature, volume, and frequency” of its financial 
support.76 
 The ICJ stated that “in light of the evidence and material available 
to it, [it was] not satisfied that all the operations launched by the contra 
force, at every stage of the conflict, reflected strategy and tactics wholly 
devised by the United States.”77  In its opinion, the ICJ did not downplay 
the U.S.’ support and openly admitted that a number of operations were 
“decided and planned . . . at least in close collaboration” with U.S. 
advisors.78  The ICJ also determined that although the United States did not 
create the contra force, it “largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and 
organized” at least one of the contra groups.79  
 Despite this, it again held that not “all contra operations reflected 
strategy and tactics wholly devised by the United States.”80  Furthermore, 
the ICJ also determined that the United States did not give “direct and 
critical combat support.”81  The ICJ interpreted “direct and critical combat 
support” to mean that the support provided by the United States “was 
tantamount to direct intervention by the United States combat forces.”82 
 In determining that the contras actions could not be attributed to 
the U.S., the ICJ reasoned in the following manner: 
 
The Court has to determine . . . whether or not the 
relationship of the contras to the United States 
                                           
72 Id. 
73 Id. ¶ 102. 
74 Id. ¶ 103. 
75 Id. ¶ 104. 
76 Id. ¶ 107. 
77 Id. ¶ 106 (emphasis added). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. ¶ 108. 
80 Id. (emphasis added). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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Government was so much one of dependence on the one 
side and control on the other that it would be right to 
equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the 
United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that 
Government.83 . . . .  [D]espite the heavy subsidies and 
other support provided to them [the contras] by the United 
States, there is no clear evidence of the United States 
having actually exercised such a degree of control in all 
fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its 
behalf.84  
. . . .  
All forms of United States participation mentioned above, 
and even the general control by the respondent State over a 
force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in 
themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United 
States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts 
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by 
the applicant State.85 
 
 In Nicaragua, the ICJ established a high standard for imputing 
responsibility of a non-state actor’s actions to a state:  the effective control 
test.  The effective control test requires a state to essentially be in total 
control of the non-state actors, and the state must specifically direct or 
enforce violations of international law.  The ICJ’s use of the terms “wholly 
devised” when referring to strategy and tactics, “all” when referring to the 
operations launched by the contras, and “every” when referring to the 
stages of the conflict shows that the ICJ’s effective control test requires 
near total control of the non-state actor throughout the entire conflict and 
execution of operations.86  Subsequent decisions by international tribunals, 
most notably the ICTY in Tadi!, and scholarly articles87 have cast doubt on 
the efficacy of the effective control test.  
 
C. Tadi! and The Overall Control Test 
  Tadi! was decided in 1999, more than ten years after the 
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Nicaragua case.88  However, the issues of how and when to hold a state 
accountable for the actions of non-state actors returned in Tadi!.89  The 
ICTY developed the overall control test and lowered the level of necessary 
control from that required by Nicaragua.90  Tadi! distinguished between 
two types of non-state actors and the level of control needed for each:  (1) 
actors organized into a military structure; and (2) actors not organized into 
a military structure.91  The ICTY determined that the necessary level of 
control is higher for the second group than for the first.92  
The ICTY first examined militarily structured groups in its 
discussion of the soundness of Nicaragua’s effective control test.  The 
ICTY described these groups as “organised and hierarchically 
structured.”93  These groups tend to have “a chain of command and a set of 
rules as well as the outward symbols of authority.”94  It determined that the 
effective control test, as established by the ICJ, was not an appropriate test 
in determining whether a state could be held responsible for the actions of 
militarily structured groups supported and assisted by the state because the 
effective control test was “at variance” with logic, judicial practice, and 
state practice.95  Instead, the ICTY proposed the overall control test for 
individuals organized as a militarily structured group.96  
 The ICTY turned to other international tribunals to show 
widespread reliance on a less stringent test than the effective control test 
propounded in Nicaragua.97  In its discussion of a Mexico-United States 
General Claims Commission case, the ICTY noted that “the Commission 
did not enquire as to whether or not specific instructions had been issued 
concerning” the internationally unlawful act committed by a member of the 
Mexican irregular army.98  In that case, the Commission held Mexico 
responsible for the actions of the non-state actor.99  This was one example 
that demonstrated that other international tribunals had established a lower 
standard than that required by the effective control test.  
The ICTY next turned to an Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
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case that discussed a military group who enforced the law, forced 
Americans to leave their homes, detained those Americans in a hotel, and 
searched them at an airport.100  The ICTY concluded the non-state actors 
were “performing de facto official functions,”101 that is, functions that are 
generally solely within the purview of state authority.  The ICTY 
emphasized that the state was held responsible for the actions of this group 
absent “specific instructions” from the state.102  Despite the lack of 
instructions from the state, the ICTY noted that the tribunal concluded that 
when a military group acts as though it were a de facto state organ, the state 
will be responsible for the actions of that group.103  Both of these examples 
show that courts have not necessarily focused on whether specific 
instructions were issued regarding the internationally unlawful acts.  
Rather, the second court looked at whether a non-state actor was 
performing state functions and how the state responded.  
 In the end, the ICTY determined that to impute the acts of a 
militarily organized group to a state, it “must be proved that the State 
wields overall control over the group.”104  A state does this, according to 
the ICTY, “by equipping and financing the group” and “by coordinating or 
helping in the general planning of its military activity.”105  It is not, 
however, necessary for the state to issue “instructions for the commission 
of specific acts contrary to international law.”106 
 The location of unlawful acts and the location of the state also 
mattered to the ICTY; it stated that if the unlawful acts are committed in 
the territory of a state other than the controlling state, then “more extensive 
and compelling evidence” is needed to show the state “is genuinely in 
control . . . not merely by financing and equipping them, but also by 
generally directing or helping plan their actions.”107  However, if the 
conflict is between two adjacent states and the controlling state is 
attempting to expand its territory “through the armed forces which it 
controls, it may be easier to establish the threshold.”108 
 After discussing groups organized in a military structure, the ICTY 
turned to groups not organized by military structures.109  As the ICTY did 
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with militarily organized groups, it discussed the deliberations of other 
international tribunals that investigated the same issues as those at hand in 
Tadi!.110  In the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
case decided by the ICJ, the ICTY argued that the ICJ correctly determined 
that the Iranian students who had taken members of an embassy staff 
hostage “had not initially acted on behalf of Iran” because the “Iranian 
authorities had not specifically instructed them to perform those acts.”111 
However, after “Iranian authorities formally approved and endorsed the 
occupation of the Embassy,” the students became “de facto agents of the 
Iranian State and their acts became internationally attributable to that 
State.”112 
 In discussing the issue of control, as analyzed by the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case, the ICTY stated that “it was deemed necessary by the 
Court that these persons not only be paid by United States organs but also 
act ‘on the instructions’ of those organs (in addition to their being 
supervised and receiving logistical support from them).”113  The ICTY 
determined that a higher level of control was necessary for non-militarily 
structured groups than for militarily organized groups.114  For individuals or 
groups of individuals not organized into military groups, the ICTY 
suggested a higher standard:  “[C]ourts have not considered an overall or 
general level of control to be sufficient [with regard to non-militarily 
organized groups], but have instead insisted upon specific instructions or 
directives aimed at the commission of specific acts, or have required public 
approval of those acts following their commission.”115 
 In sum, the ICTY determined that the “extent of requisite State 
control varies” depending on the circumstances.”116  To determine whether 
an individual or group that is not militarily organized  “has acted as a de 
facto State organ when performing a specific act, it is necessary to ascertain 
whether specific instructions concerning the commission of that particular 
act had been issued by that State to the individual or group in question.”117  
Furthermore, sufficient control may also be established if, after the 
unlawful act has been perpetrated, the state “publicly endorse[s] or 
approve[s]” the actions taken.118 
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 For militarily structured groups, the overall control test is a lower 
standard than the effective control test.  A state must not only finance and 
equip such military group, but also help or coordinate in the general 
planning of the non-state actor’s military activities.119  Specific instructions 
regarding the execution of internationally unlawful actions are not 
necessary.120  This is a lower standard than the effective control test that 
required the strategy and tactics to be wholly devised by the controlling 
state.121  The effective control test also required the controlling state’s 
whole involvement in the development of military tactics and strategy at 
every stage of the conflict.122  The overall control test only requires 
involvement in general planning.123 
 
III. Analysis of Attribution in the Georgia-Russia Cyber Conflict 
 This section first discusses whether a breach of international law 
occurred in the Georgia-Russia situation.  This is a threshold question that 
needs to be addressed before the control test analysis, as a discussion of 
state responsibility is irrelevant without a non-state actor’s violation of 
international law.  This section then applies the tests to the available facts 
of the Georgia-Russia situation.124   
A. Was There a Breach of International Law? 
 Whether there was a breach of international law by a non-state 
actor is the threshold question for both the effective control and overall 
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control tests.  Without a breach of international law there is no reason to 
consider whether a state is responsible for the actions of a non-state actor.  
Because this article focuses on the actions of non-state actors, it is 
unnecessary to discuss whether the Russian troops’ presence in Georgia 
breached international law.   
 With regard to the UN Charter, one scholar aptly noted that “cyber-
warfare will challenge and test the Charter’s bounds.”125  While there has 
not been a concrete determination as to how, or even if, a cyber attack 
breaches international law, the Russian hackers’ actions are most likely to 
qualify as a breach of international law if their actions constituted a use of 
force, as described by the UN Charter, against Georgia.126  Some scholars 
argue that a concrete interpretation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
should be applied to cyber attacks, while others contend that specific 
treaties on cyber attacks would prove more useful.127  One scholar has 
suggested that a more precise definition of the term “cyber attack” would 
solve many problems in this area.128  
 The writings of international scholars have created a spectrum of 
unlawfulness on which different cyber attacks can fall depending on their 
intensity.129  On one end of the spectrum, there is the general prohibition of 
intervention as discussed in the 1981 UN General Assembly Declaration of 
Non-intervention.130  The idea of non-intervention states that because states 
are sovereign, each state has the authority and is solely responsible for 
actions that take place within the boundaries of that state, and other states 
should not interfere or intervene in domestic issues.131  In this case, non-
intervention assumes that states are competent to deal with the cyber issues 
that arise within their borders.  On the other end of the spectrum, a cyber 
attack has been defined as a use of force under the UN Charter only if the 
effects of the attack are similar to those that result from kinetic warfare.132  
From one point of view, to qualify as armed attacks, the “cyber operations 
must be severe enough . . . to result in damage to or destruction of property 
or injury to or death of individuals.”133  Economic coercion and political 
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coercion are insufficient.134  But, a cyber attack that has similar non-kinetic 
consequences to a kinetic attack may be sufficient.135  For example, if a 
country’s “Stock Exchange or other financial institutions were to be 
bombed and the markets disrupted as a consequence,” this would qualify as 
a use of armed force.136  In this example, the “economic consequences or 
the action would by far outweigh the physical damage to the buildings.”137  
For some scholars, a cyber attack that achieved the same results would 
likely be considered a use of force if it, indeed, achieved results similar to 
those caused by dropping a bomb on the stock exchange.138 
 In Georgia, the cyber attacks fall onto different areas along the 
unlawfulness spectrum, depending on the perspective one takes.  The cyber 
attacks from Russia against Georgia targeted government websites, 
business and financial institutions, educational institutions, and media 
outlets.  The attacks isolated the country from the rest of the world and 
Georgian citizens from their government.  The indirect effect of the attacks 
aided the Russian military in accomplishing its mission to protect Russian 
interests in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  The cyber attacks disrupted 
Georgian communications and generally caused confusion among the 
Georgian government and civilians in a way that allowed the Russian 
military to more effectively operate. The cyber attacks also disrupted 
Georgian markets by effectively shutting down Georgia’s financial system 
when the cyber attacks caused outside banks to refuse to operate within the 
country.  For these reasons, this article assumes Russia’s cyber attacks 
against Georgia met the bar for use of force and breached international law. 
 
B. Applying the Tests for State Responsibility 
 
1. Russian Responsibility Under Article 8 
 
Article 8, the effective control test, and the overall control test set a 
high bar for attributing responsibility of the internationally wrongful acts 
committed by a non-state actor to a state.  The difficulty in reaching that 
bar is exacerbated when the misdeeds of the non-state actor are committed 
in cyberspace and not through kinetic means.  Because of the relatively 
recent emergence of cyber attacks on the international stage, the ILC, ICJ, 
and ICTY have yet to consider cyber warfare in their control and 
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responsibility determinations.  The current attribution regime proves 
unworkable and a new attribution regime should be developed for cyber 
attacks. 
 Under Article 8, a state is responsible for the actions of a non-state 
actor when the non-state actor is acting “on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that state in carrying out the conduct.”139  The 
“acting on the instructions” element of Article 8 requires non-state actors to 
act on instructions received from the state to impute responsibility to the 
state.140  With regard to the Georgia-Russia conflict, many experts believe 
that the time nexus between the conventional attack and the cyber attacks 
demonstrated that the cyber attackers, at the very least, knew an attack was 
going to be launched.141  However, mere knowledge of an attack does not 
constitute “acting on instructions” from the state pursuant to Article 8.142  
Had the Russian government instructed the groups to conduct the cyber 
attacks or officially sanctioned them after the fact, it would have been 
tantamount to authorizing the attacks.143 Concurrence in time between 
conventional and cyber attacks alone is not enough to establish specific 
factual relationship required by Article 8.144  Without more knowledge of 
what actually took place between the Russian government and the cyber 
attackers it is extremely difficult to say that the Russian government 
authorized the attacks. 
  
2. Russian Responsibility Under the Effective Control Test 
 
The ICJ’s effective control test requires that a state “actually 
exercise such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating” the non-
state actor “as acting on its behalf.”145  The court required the state to 
wholly devise the non-state actor’s strategy and tactics; financing and 
equipping non-state actors is insufficient to establish state responsibility.146  
The ICJ also required the state to exert near total control over the non-state 
actors in conducting operations.147  Direct and critical combat support from 
the state to the non-state actor is essential in meeting the effective control 
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test.148    
  As applied to the Georgia-Russia conflict, the effective control test 
would not result in Russian responsibility for the cyber attackers’ activities 
due to difficulty in establishing a connection between the state and the non-
state actors.149  In fact, no communication between the Russian government 
and the organized crime groups has been discovered.150  If the Russian 
government is indeed behind the cyber attacks, the lack of hard evidence 
allowed them to circumvent Article 8’s undergirding policies by 
successfully supporting non-state actors’ cyber attacks against Georgia 
during an armed conflict. 
 Additionally, in the Georgia-Russia conflict, the few facts available 
tend to show that the Russian government did not exercise effective control 
over either group conducting the cyber attacks.  The means of the attacks - 
the botnets and sites made available to hacktivists - were provided by the 
organized crime groups, not the state.151  Furthermore, by all accounts, the 
Russian government did not provide direct and critical combat support to 
the cyber attackers.152  If anything, the cyber attackers provided direct 
combat support to the Russian troops by disabling the Georgian 
government’s ability to communicate with its citizens.  For example, 
“media and communication facilities were not attacked by kinetic means,” 
possibly because the cyber attackers had already carried out attacks against 
them and disabled them.153  Due to the apparent lack of near total control 
exerted by the Russian government over the organized crime groups, the 
effective control test would not hold Russia accountable for the cyber 
attackers’ activities. 
 
3. Russian Responsibility Under the Overall Control Test 
 
 When applying the overall control test, it is first necessary to 
determine whether the cyber attackers fit within the definition of a 
militarily structured group.154  If the cyber attackers can be defined as a 
militarily structured group, the overall control test of Tadi! would apply.  
Under Tadi!, Russian organized crimes groups would have to demonstrate 
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a hierarchical structure, a chain of command, and outward symbols of 
authority to be considered militarily structured groups.155  If these 
characteristics existed, then the Russian government could be held 
responsible under the overall control test, as it applies to militarily 
structured groups, for the actions of the organized crime groups.156  
However, if organized crimes groups do not qualify as militarily structured 
groups, it is unlikely that the cyber attackers’ actions could be imputed to 
the Russian state.  Here, it is important to differentiate between the 
organized crime groups and the hacktivists.  It would be most difficult to 
hold the Russian government accountable for the actions of the hacktivists 
under the overall control test because they were, most likely, not militarily 
structured, as they are described as volunteers recruited on social 
networking sites for the purpose of carrying out these specific attacks close 
to the time of or during the attacks.157 
 Assuming that the organized crime groups in Russia are militarily 
structured groups, there is a chance that the overall control test may impute 
responsibility for their actions to the Russian government.  A state wields 
overall control over a militarily structured group by equipping, financing, 
and coordinating or helping in the general planning of the group’s military 
activities.158  It is not necessary for the state to issue instructions regarding 
the group’s internationally wrongful actions under the overall control 
test.159  
 However, given the available facts, it is unlikely that the overall 
control test applies to the Russian organized crime groups.  There is 
evidence that, prior to August 2008, at least one of the organized crime 
groups involved in the conflict used and leased botnets similar to the ones 
used in the cyber attacks.160  While it may be assumed that the Russian 
government informed the organized crime groups of its plans to wage a 
kinetic attack against Georgia, this alone would be insufficient to assign 
responsibility for the cyber attacks to the Russian government unless those 
communications constituted coordinating or helping in the general planning 
of the groups’ military activities.  Even then, in order to satisfy the test, the 
Russian government would have also needed to equip and finance a group 
that was already equipped and already financed.  
  Conversely, if the organized crime groups in Russia are not 
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militarily structured groups, they must meet the overall control test’s higher 
bar for activity to impute responsibility to the Russian government.161  For 
a state to be held responsible for the actions of its citizens as opposed to its 
militarily structured groups, the state must have specifically instructed its 
civilians to conduct unlawful activities or must have formally approved and 
endorsed those activities.162  Again, it is unlikely that the Russian state gave 
specific instructions to its citizens to launch a cyber attack against Georgia.  
No information has been discovered that would prove such instructions, nor 
has the Russian government formally approved the cyber attacks. The 
interactions between the Russian government and the organized crime 
groups and hacktivists fail to satisfy the requirements of the overall control 
test.  
 
a.  Subsequent Endorsement of Actions 
 
In the Georgia-Russia conflict, Russia did not subsequently 
authorize the actions of the organized crime groups or of the hacktivists.  
Similar to what happened in the United States Diplomatic and Consular 
Staff in Tehran case cited above,163 had Russia subsequently authorized the 
attacks by claiming that the cyber attackers were acting in defense of the 
Russian state, it would have implicitly authorized the cyber attacks and 
then could have been held responsible for the attacks.  Article 51 of the UN 
Charter authorizes only states to use force in self-defense against other 
states.164  If Russia subsequently authorized the attacks as a form of self-
defense, it would be imputing state power to the cyber attackers.  Russia’s 
subsequent claim that its civilians were acting in self-defense would have 
likely risen to the level of formal approval of the attacks needed to attribute 
responsibility for the cyber attacks to the Russian government.  The closest 
anyone in the government has come to approving the actions occurred 
when a low-level official said that the cyber attacks were part of a larger 
information battle against the West.165  
 The fact that Russia has not subsequently endorsed the citizens’ 
cyber attacks voids Russia’s possible claim that the cyber attackers were 
merely acting in self-defense of their fellow Russians.  It would be 
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disingenuous for Russia to claim that it did not authorize the attacks, yet 
still claim that its citizens were acting on behalf of the government to 
defend the Russian civilians in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Furthermore, 
there is no incentive for the Russian government to subsequently authorize 
the cyber attacks.  Endorsing the attacks would only lead to responsibility 
for the attacks being imputed to the Russian government.  Under the 
current regime, the Russian government can enjoy the benefit of the cyber 
attacks without accepting responsibility for them. 
 
 IV. Problems with the Current Attribution Regime and Proposals 
for a New Regime 
 
 Under the current regime for state attribution, the level and type of 
support given by the state to the non-state actor is scrutinized:  the greater 
and more critical the support, the more likely it is that a state will be held 
responsible for the actions of a non-state actor.166  The low-cost of cyber 
attacks and the ease with which they can be carried out allow the support 
regime to be reversed.  For example, the effective control and overall 
control tests require the state to provide support to the non-state actor.167  
However, in the Georgia-Russia conflict, the cyber attackers provided 
important support to the Russian military by disrupting communications 
and isolating both the Georgian state from the other states and the citizenry 
from the government.  The cyber attackers could have done this without 
anything more than mere knowledge of when the kinetic attacks were to 
take place.  The organized crime groups already had the means to carry out 
the attacks.  They only needed to mobilize anti-Georgian, Russian-friendly 
citizens to assist in the attacks’ execution.  The circumstances of the 
Georgia-Russia cyber conflict create problems when applying the current 
attribution tests; therefore, a new test should be devised for state attribution 
when a cyber attack is involved.   
There are differences and similarities between the attribution issues 
in both Nicaragua and Tadi! and the Georgia-Russia conflict.  Most 
conspicuously, in the most recent conflict, a state was likely working with 
non-state actors to conduct a cyber attack against another state whereas in 
previous cases states were working with non-state actors to conduct armed 
attacks against another state.  Another major difference is that in previous 
cases, the armed groups were located in the target state, while the cyber 
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attackers were located, in large part, within the state launching the main 
armed attack.  This highlights a major difference between armed groups 
and cyber groups:  a cyber attack group can be located anywhere 
throughout the world.  It does not necessarily have to be located in the 
target state or in the attacking state.  This creates a significant evidentiary 
problem.  Whereas the armed attackers can be found and located in the 
middle of the conflict, cyber attackers can be located throughout the world.  
In the Georgia-Russia conflict, it is also important to remember that there 
were two groups involved:  the organized crime groups and the hacktivists, 
meaning that the parties responsible were not even centrally located within 
Russia. 
 Furthermore, hacktivists can make it appear as though a cyber 
attack is originating in a country other than the one in which it is actually 
originating.168  One scholar noted that “[a]nonymity is in fact one of the 
greatest advantages of cyber warfare: even though the attacks might appear 
to originate from computers located in a certain country, this does not 
necessarily mean that that country, or even the owners of the computers 
involved, were behind such actions.”169  The non-state actors in this case 
were organized crime groups and civilian hacktivists that could have been 
launching the attacks from the comfort of their home, business, or 
neighborhood Internet cafe.  
 This issue of location of the perpetrators also raises legal questions.  
In the Georgia-Russia conflict, experts were able to narrow the cyber 
attackers’ location to organized crime groups within Russia and hacktivists 
mostly located within Russia.170  This helped narrow the scope of assigning 
responsibility for the attacks and may prove critical in narrowing 
responsibility.  The ICTY argued that in the case of a state that employs 
non-state actors to achieve its territorial ambitions over a neighboring state, 
the bar may be lower than that articulated in the overall control test, 
meaning it would be easier to attribute the actions of non-state actors to a 
state if those actions furthered the territorial ambitions of that state.171  
Therefore, if a connection can be shown between the Russian government 
and the cyber attackers, the bar for attributing responsibility for the attacks 
to the state may be lower due to Russia’s territorial ambitions over Georgia.  
Russia did not annex South Ossetia or Abkhazia following its incursion 
into Georgia, which would have been a clear demonstration of Russia’s 
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territorial aspirations.172  Instead, Russia remains a protectorate for the two 
break-off regions.173 
  Another difference, and attribution difficulty, between the court-
investigated situations and the Georgia-Russia cyber attacks is that many of 
the attacks against Georgia were carried out by individual hacktivists, 
whereas the attacks in Nicaragua and Tadi! were carried out by armed 
groups.  It is easier to define what a group of people has done than it is to 
determine what many separate individuals have done.  While there is some 
precedent for tribunals holding states liable for individual civilians’ actions, 
it would be extremely difficult for a state to find and prosecute every 
hacktivist involved in a cyber attack, especially after the attack has 
occurred.  This is due to the number of participants and difficulty in 
ascertaining the attackers’ identity. 
 Yet another difference between the international tribunals’ cases 
and the Georgia-Russia situation that leads to problems of application of 
existing attribution law is that of the equipping and financing the cyber 
attacks.  This was a factor that both the ICJ and the ICTY considered 
important in determining whether or not a state should be responsible for 
the actions of a non-state actor.174  One expert estimated the cost of a cyber 
campaign at “[four] cents per machine” or, in total, “the cost of replacing a 
tank tread.”175  This low cost and easy access allow small groups and 
individuals to get involved:  “unlike in traditional warfare, cyberspace 
attacks can easily be carried out not only by states, but also by groups and 
even individuals: all it takes is a computer, software and a connection to the 
Internet.”176  In the Georgia-Russia conflict, the Russian government 
probably did not supply the cyber attackers with botnets, servers, or 
computers to wage the attacks.  In fact, Russian organized crime groups, 
most notably the Russian Business Network, use and lease the same botnets 
used in these attacks for their own criminal purposes and most likely 
provided their own resources for the attack.177  Determining the location 
and identity of cyber attackers due to the low cost of cyber attacks and the 
ability to mask the true origin of the attack are difficulties that do not arise 
in armed attacks.  These differences between cyber and kinetic attacks 
show the importance of developing a different test for state attribution in 
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cases where cyber attacks are used in conjunction with armed attacks. 
 
V. Shifting the Focus to the Timing of Kinetic and Cyber Attacks 
 
 One factor that helped narrow the scope of where to attribute 
responsibility in the Georgia-Russia conflict was the coordinated timing of 
the kinetic and attacks.  This factor may be a good starting point in 
determining whether a state is responsible for a non-state actor’s actions.178  
In the Georgia-Russia conflict, the fact that both attacks happened at 
essentially the same time led many cyber security experts to believe that 
the Russian government had at least informed the cyber attackers of their 
intent to conduct military operations against Georgia.179  As an example, if 
a cyber attack was launched by Brazilian cyber attackers at the same time 
that a kinetic attack was launched by Russia against the same target, it 
would be at least a starting point for determining that there may have been 
some sort of an agreement between the Russian government and the 
Brazilian cyber attackers that rose to the level of the Brazilian cyber 
attackers acting as the Russian government’s agents.  
 Placing more emphasis on the timing of attacks may be a workable 
solution in assigning state responsibility:  if a state’s kinetic operation 
against another state is accompanied by a non-state actor’s cyber attack, 
then perhaps the attacking state should be responsible for both attacks.  
This is certainly not a perfect solution.  It is possible that enemies of the 
state engaging in the armed attack could exploit this option by 
simultaneously launching a cyber attack, leading to an inaccurate 
assignment of responsibility.   
Nonetheless, a focus on timing should be further explored.  It may 
not rise to the same level as either control test, but perhaps the lower 
standard of a “working in tandem” test would be sufficient to discourage 
states from working with non-state actors in carrying out cyber attacks 
against another state, because the first state could potentially be held 
accountable for any cyber attack that occurred in tandem with its kinetic 
attack.  The attacking state would then have the burden of proving that it 
did not work in tandem with the non-state cyber attacker.  This solution, of 
course, fails to include conflicts that are carried out completely in cyber 
space with no kinetic counterpart that still have devastating effects on the 
victim state.  It may, however, provide a practical solution in dealing with 
the situation of a cyber attack being carried out in concert with a kinetic 
                                           
178 Roscini, supra at note 129, at 97. 
179 U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit Special Report, supra note 23, at 3; Shakarian, supra note 15, at 66. 
 82 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIII 
 
attack.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The increasing prevalence of non-state actors in internal and 
international armed conflicts continues to raise problems for the 
international community.  Myriad legal questions arise when non-state 
actors become involved in armed conflicts.  These legal questions increase 
when the non-state actors are the perpetrators of a cyber attack, especially 
when the cyber attack is conducted in concert with a kinetic attack. 
 The international community should apprise itself of the attribution 
issues that arise in a cyber conflict, especially when the cyber attacks 
accompany kinetic attacks.  The tests articulated in Nicaragua and Tadi! 
do not provide a strong solution for cyber conflict.  Article 8 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility was written in light of the Nicaragua and 
Tadi! tests and draws heavily on the analysis of those two cases.  It also 
fails to grasp the scope of the problem of attribution for cyber attacks. 
 States should consider the difficulty in identifying the host-state of 
a cyber attack because of the attendant difficulty in determining the 
initiator and perpetrator of cyber attacks when developing a new rule of 
state responsibility.  States should also look to differences between the non-
state participants in kinetic warfare and cyber warfare, as well as the 
relative ease at which cyber warfare can be financed and the means to 
launch a cyber attack can be made accessible.  The international 
community should develop a new test for determining how much control a 
state needs to exercise over a non-state actor in a kinetic conflict in order to 
attribute responsibility for the non-state actor’s actions to the state.  At least 
one factor in this test should be the temporal proximity within which the 
kinetic attack occurred and when the cyber attack took place.  This factor is 
not a perfect approach:  cyber attackers unfriendly to the state launching 
armed attacks may take advantage of the test in order to assign blame for 
the cyber attacks to the state that is launching the armed attack.  However, 
it may be a good starting point in thinking about attribution issues when 
cyber attacks and armed attacks are carried out together. 
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